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I. INTRODUCTION

Sound the alarm! There's a national emergency. It seems that
teenage women' are engaging in sexual intercourse and some of
them are getting pregnant.2 Worse yet, some teenage women are
actually electing to have an abortion. Thankfully, Congress is aware
of the crisis and is currently taking steps to address this pressing
issue.4 In fact, the House of Representatives has passed a bill that
directly impacts this most important issue. The Child Custody
Protection Act6 ("CCPA") will criminalize the act of transporting a
minor across state lines in order to obtain an abortion. This bill is
intended to work in conjunction with state laws that already exist.8
These state laws generally require that a minor seeking an abortion
gain the consent of her parents or the courts in order to have an
abortion.' Both the proliferation of state laws and the emergence of a
* J.D. May 2000, Washington College of Law, American University; MA., George Mason
University, 1996; BA., George Mason University, 1994. I would like to thank my wife for her
support and encouragement.
1. Throughout this comment, unless noted otherwise, teenage women refers to women
age 15 to 19 years old.
2. See STEPHANIEJ. VENTURA, TJ. MATHEWS & SALLY C. CURTIN, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, TEENAGE BIRTHS IN THE UNITED STATES:
STATE TRENDS, 1991-96, AN UPDATE 3 (1998) [hereinafter TEENAGE BIRTHS] (reporting the
trends in the teenage birthrate). This report updates previously published reports that detail
national statistics regarding teenage birth rates. Id. at 2.
3. See Trends and Timelines Teen Sex H.: Pregnancy, Abortion, Birth Rates Down, AM. POL.
NETWORK, Apr. 30, 1999, available in Westlaw, ALLNEWS (discussing the teenage abortion rates
of several states).
4. See Child Custody Protection Act, H.R. 3682, 105th Cong. (1998) (prohibiting the
taking of minors across state lines in order to avoid state laws that require parental involvement
in abortion decisions).
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id. (stating that the act of knowingly transporting a minor across state lines to
obtain an abortion in order to avoid a state statute can result in a fine or imprisonment for a
term not longer than a year).
8. See id. (supporting state laws by outlawing the transportation of minors across state
lines to obtain an abortion, therefore, forcing pregnant teenage girls to comply with the law of
their state). The impetus of the Act was to shore up state parental involvement statutes by
outlawing the only remaining method available to pregnant teenage girls in states with parental
involvement statutes: fleeing to another state to obtain an abortion without the interference of
parents.
9. See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (involving a challenge to a Utah statute that
required a physician to notify the parents of a pregnant minor who was seeking an abortion);
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (reviewing a Massachusetts statute that required a
pregnant teenager to obtain the consent of her parents or the approval of a judge in order to
have an abortion); see alsoJ. Shoshanna Ehrlich &Jamie Ann Sabino, A Minor's Right to Abortion
- The Unconstitutionality of ParentalParticipationin Bypass Hearings, 25 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1185,
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new effort to enact a federal statute that will limit teenage girls'
access to abortion would lead one to believe that teens are getting
pregnant in ever increasing numbers, and are thus having abortions
in increasing numbers. However, a recent report from the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention ("CDC") indicates that the birth
rate among girls ages fifteen to nineteen has declined.'Y
The current congressional effort to limit a minor's access to an
abortion seems to be part of a general preoccupation with the sexual
activity of adolescent girls and the tendency to blame them for a
variety of problems facing our nation." This general preoccupation
has also led to the enactment of statutes in several states that require
parental notification and to the Supreme Court's modification and
approval of these statutes. 2 In light of the recent data regarding the
declining teenage birthrate, this pervasive preoccupation is
troublesome." Furthermore, the effort to pass the Child Custody
Protection Act is problematic, as such an effort is part of the larger14
trend to limit access to abortion for both women and teenage girls.
Given the frequency with which groups have asked the Supreme
Court to review state parental notification statutes, it is likely that a
federal statute that prohibits the transportation of minors across state
lines for the purpose of obtaining an abortion will be challenged.5
1193 (1991) (describing the mechanism of state statutes that require parental notification);
Maggie O'Shaughnessy, Note, The Worst of Both Worlds?:ParentalInvolvement Requirements and the
PrivacyRights of Mature Minors,57 OHIO ST. LJ. 1731, 1731-32 (1996) (discussing the states with
parental notification statutes and the instances in which the Supreme Court has reviewed these
state statutes). The two cases cited above are not the only cases heard by the Supreme Court
involving challenges to state laws restricting minor's access to abortion. Instead, these cases are
representative of the many cases on which the Supreme Court has ruled. A more detailed
discussion of such cases follows in this Comment, infraPart IV.
10. See TEENAGE BIRTHS, supra note 2, at 2 (finding that national teenage birthrates have
declined since 1991).
11. See Deborah Jones Merritt, EndingPoverty by Cutting Teenaged Births: Promise, Failureand
Paths to the Future 57 OHIO ST. LJ. 441, 441 (1996) (proposing that policymakers have held
teenage childbearing as the cause of many societal ills such as "poverty, childhood deprivation,
and intergenerational disadvantage").
12. See Catherine Grevers Schmidt, Where PrivacyFails:EqualProtectionand the Abortion Rights
of Minors, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 597, 613 (1993) (proposing a link between a preoccupation with
the sexuality of adolescent girls and the enactment of statutes that impact their sexual
behaviors). Historically, a woman's ability to reproduce has been used to justify laws that
oppressed her. Id.
13. See TEENAGE BIRTHS, supra note 2, at 2 (postulating that the general preoccupation
with the sexual behavior of teenage girls has lead to a persistent effort to regulate this behavior
via legislation).
14. See Charlene Carres, LegislativeEfforts to Limit State ReproductivePrivacyRights, 25 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 273, 276-78 (1998) (discussing the constitutional right to an abortion and the privacy
right to abortion under the Florida constitution).
15. See O'Shaughnessy, supra note 9, at 1732 (noting that the Supreme Court has heard
cases involving parent involvement statutes ten times since 1976). Given the frequency with
which groups have challenged state statutes, and the number of times groups have asked the
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Part II discusses the data regarding the declining teenage birthrate.
Part III establishes the framework for the Child Custody Protection
Act by reviewing the emergence and proliferation of state parental
notification statutes. 6 Part IV considers the constitutionality of the
Act in the context of previous Supreme Court decisions. Part V
details the history and application of the CCPA. Part VI proposes
legislation that seeks to preserve the national decline in the teenage
birthrate. Finally, Part VII concludes that the right to privacy and the
right to abortion access should be extended to all women, regardless
of age.

II. DATA ON DECLINING TEENAGE BIRTHRATES

According to CDC statistics, the teenage birthrate declined during
the 1990s. 17 Recent data indicates that during the period of 1991
through 1996, the nationwide teenage birthrate fell sharply. 8 In fact,
the birth rates for teenagers ages fifteen to nineteen years old
dropped 12.4 percent from 1991 to 1996, falling from 62.1 births per
1000 teenage youths to 54.4.19
Only Puerto Rico and Guam
experienced an increase in the teenage birthrate.
The trend in declining teenage birthrates is not a new
phenomenon.2 '
Between 1960 and 1975 the birthrate among
Court to review state parental involvement statutes, it is likely that groups will challenge the
statutory product of the current legislative efforts underway in Congress. In fact, given the
restrictive nature of the legislation, groups such as Planned Parenthood will likely challenge
this legislation should it proceed to enactment. Id.
16. See, e.g., H.R. 3682, 105th Cong. (1998) (pursuing the enactment of a federal statute
that seeks to support existing state statutes that place restrictions on a minor's access to
abortion).
17. See STEPHANIEJ. VENTURA, SALLY C. CLARKE & T.J. MATHEWS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
AND HuMAN SERVICES, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, RECENT DECLINES IN
TEENAGE BIRTH RATES IN THE UNITED STATES: VARIATIONS BY STATE, 1990-94, at 1 (1996)
[hereinafter RECENT DECLINES] (providing a comparison of annual data from 1970-1994);
TEENAGE BIRTHS, supranote 2, at 2 (updating data provided in previous reports).
18. See TEENAGE BIRTHS, supra note 2, at 2 (reporting on the recent declines in the
national teenage birthrate).
19. See TEENAGE BIRTHS, supranote 2, at 3 (noting the decrease in birthrates for teenagers

15 to 19 years of age between 1991 and 1996).
20. See TEENAGE BIRTHS, supra note 2, at 3 (stating that the birthrate for Puerto Rican
women ages 15 to 19 years old between 1991 and 1996 rose 3.3 percent). Among 15 to 17 year
olds in Puerto Rico, the birthrate rose from 50.8 per 1000 women in 1991 to 55.6 in 1996. In
Guam, however, the increase was more pronounced. The teenage birthrate in Guam increased
22 percent between 1991 and 1996. The teenage birthrate among women between the ages of
15 and 17 in Guam rose from 55 per 1000 women in 1991 to 69.5 in 1996. Id.
21. See Megan Weinstein, The Teenage Pregnancy "Problem": Welfare Reform and the Personal
Responsibility and Work OpportunityReconciliation Act of 1996, 13 BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ. 117, 118
(1998) (citing KRISTIN LUKER, DUBIOUS CONCEPTIONS: THE POLITICS OF TEENAGE PREGNANCY
71 (1996)). This law review article discusses the significance of a declining teenage birthrate in
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teenagers ages fifteen to nineteen years old dropped from 91 births
per 1000 in 1960 to 55.6 births per 1000 in 1975.22 Furthermore, the
rate of teenage pregnancy continued to decline between 1975 and
1985,23 with the teenage birthrate falling from 55.6 births per 1000 in
1975, to 51 births per 1000 in 1985.24
A. Differences in the Statisticsby Age and Race
In analyzing the birthrate statistics, it is important to consider the
differences that emerge in relation to the factors of age and race.25
In those states with higher Hispanic and African American
populations, the overall teenage birthrate is higher than the teenage
birthrate in states with low Hispanic and African American
populations, thus implying higher birthrates among these minority
populations.26 Furthermore, an important distinction arises among
different age groups: 27 the birthrate among teenagers between the
ages of eighteen and nineteen was more than double the rate for
teenagers between the ages of fifteen and seventeen. 8
B. BehavioralDifferences in the Last 20 Years
The teenage birthrates of the 1990s and those of the 1970s bear
interesting differences when scrutinized.'
Early in the 1970s, the
teenage birthrate was higher than today's birthrate; however, a
greater number of the 197 0s teens who were giving birth were
married."0 Fewer of today's teens are getting married, and of those
who are married, fewer are choosing to have children when
light of Congressional efforts to enact legislation aimed at addressing teen pregnancy. Id.
22. See id. at 117 n.3 (stating that the birthrate for teenage females from 15 to 19 years old
decreased by 35.4 births per 1000 between 1960 and 1975).
23. Seeidatll7n.4.
24. See id
25. See RECENT DECLINES, supra note 17, at 4-5 (highlighting the differences that arise in
teenage birthrates when focusing on various factors).
26. See RECENT DECLINES, supranote 17, at 4-5 (discussing a direct correlation between the
Hispanic and African-American teenage state population and the teenage birthrate of states).
27. See RECENT DECLINES, supra note 17, at 2 (noting the different rates in teen
pregnancies between the younger teens, 15 to 17 years old, and the older teens, 18 to 19 years
old).
28. See RECENT DECLINES, supranote 17, at 3 (stating that in 1994, the birthrate for 18 to 19
year olds was 91.4 per 1000, whereas the birthrate for 15 to 17 year olds was 37.6 per 1000).
29. See RECENT DECLINES, supra note 17, at 1 (detailing statistical points of interest
concerning teenage pregnancy).
30. See RECENT DECLINES, supra note 17, at 1 (enumerating the differences in the teenage
marriage and birth rates between the years 1970 and 1994). In 1970, 14 percent of teenagers
ages 15 to 19 were married; however, among the same age group in 1994, only 5 percent were
married. Id.
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compared with the teens of the early 1970s.3 ' Although there has
been a decline in the birthrate among married teens, the birthrate
among unmarried teens has continued to rise since the early 1980s."'
Experts attribute the decline in the teenage birthrate to several
factors. First is the relatively stable percentage of teenage girls who
are either sexually active or experienced, coupled with the increasing
use of both condoms and longer-acting contraceptives.3 3 Second,
according to Dr. Claire Broome of the CDC, "the fact that fewer teens
are getting pregnant shows that teens are accepting responsibility for
their sexual behavior to a greater extent by abstaining from sex or
using contraceptives more effectively." 4 Third is the increase in state
abortion laws concerning teens s In states that have enacted liberal
abortion statutes, the teenage birthrate fell significantly. 6
III. STATE STATUTES REQUIRING PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT

A. Overview of State Statutes
The task of drafting parental involvement legislation to meet the
many requirements set forth in existing and emerging Supreme
Court abortion decisions is not simple. 7 The considerations that
must be weighed are often difficult to reconcile when a state
endeavors to place limitations on a teenage woman's access to
abortion."s Not only must the minor's right to abortion and the
31. See RECENT DECLINES, supranote 17, at 1 (highlighting the differences in pregnancy
rates among married teenagers from 1970 to 1994). While in 1994 the birth rate of teenage
women between the ages of 15 to 19 was 388 per 1000, the birthrate among the same group in
1970 was 444 per 1000. Id.
32. See RECENT DECLINES, supra note 17, at 2 (noting the change in the birthrate of
unmarried teenagers from 1970 to 1994). Among unmarried teenagers between the ages of 15
to 19, in 1970 the birthrate was 22 per 1000 and by 1994 the birthrate had increased to 46 per
1000. Id.
33. See U.S. Said Teen Pregnancy Rates Declining; HEALTH LETTER ON THE CDC,July 13, 1998,
availablein 1998 WL 8783402 (discussing the recent statistics published by the CDC regarding
the decrease in the teenage birthrate and providing statements of CDC personnel and Secretary
of Health and Human Services Donna Shalala regarding this decrease).
34. See id.
(elaborating on the implied reasons for fewer teen pregnancies).
35. See Merrit, supranote 11, at 447 (stating that liberal abortion laws correspond to lower
birth rates).
36. See Merrit, supranote 11, at 447 (noting that when the state of New York amended its
abortion laws in 1970 to create a more liberal legislative scheme, the birthrates among white
minors fell over 14 percent while the birthrate among African-American minors fell over 18
percent).
37. See Satsie Veith, Note, The Judicial Bypass Procedureand Adolescents' Abortion Rights: The

Fallacy ofthe "Maturity"Standard,23 HOFSTPA L. REv. 453, 455 (1994) (reciting the many criteria
that must be incorporated into a statute that seeks to require a minor seeking an abortion to
involve her parents in the decision making process).
38. See id at 455 (discussing the requirements for obtaining an abortion that state
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parents' right to control their child's actions be balanced against one
another, but also these rights cannot be unduly burdened by any
legislation offered by the state! 9 Two basic types of parental
involvement statutes have emerged: parental notification statutes and
parental consent statutes.4 °
1. Parental Notification Statutes
Parental notification statutes are less intrusive than parental
consent statutes. 4' This type of statute only requires that a parent be
notified that his or her minor daughter intends to have an abortion
and does not provide a statutory mechanism to prevent the minor
from obtaining an abortion.42 In fact, under this statutory scheme,
parental or judicial consent is not necessary for a minor to obtain
access to an abortion. 43 Even though there is no statutory provision
for a parent to prevent his or her minor child from obtaining an
abortion, the simple act of notification enables parents to place
significant pressure on their minor daughter to decide not to seek an
abortion, if that is the parents' desire. 44 While state statutes must also
contain a bypass procedure wherein the minor can gain access to an
abortion without notifying a parent,45 this procedure is burdensome
and causes additional delays. 6
legislatures may place on unmarried pregnant teenagers provided there is an option for
teenagers to use the courts).
39. See O'Shaughnessy, supra note 9, at 1735 (noting the difficulties present in parental
involvement statutes).
40. See Schmidt, supra note 12, at 603 (distinguishing parental consent statutes from
parental notification statutes and the parties' corresponding rights under these legislative
schemes).
41. See Schmidt, supra note 12, at 603 (noting that parental notification statutes are less
intrusive in that parents are not granted the authority to stop their daughter from obtaining an
abortion).
42. See Schmidt, supra note 12, at 603 (establishing the primary distinction between
parental notification statutes and parental consent statutes).
43. See Schmidt, supra note 12, at 603 (explaining the significant difference between this
statutory scheme and that of consent statutes in that this scheme allows a pregnant teenager a
greater degree of autonomy to decide to seek an abortion).
44. See Schmidt, supra note 12, at 603 (acknowledging that while parental notification
statutes do not impart veto power upon the parents of a pregnant minor in terms of abortion
decisions, the act of notifying a parent may result in a de facto veto of the minor's decision).
45. See, e.g., Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292, 297 (1997) (holding that a Montana
statute requiring a judge to consider if the notification itself is in the minor's best interest is
valid and consistent with prior Supreme Court decisions); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44
(1979) (ruling that parental involvement statutes must contain ajudicial bypass procedure that
allows ajudge to consider the minor's maturity and best interests in deciding whether to permit
the minor access to an abortion without parental involvement).
46. See Schmidt, supra note 12, at 605 (discussing the delays that result from statutes
requiring judicial bypass and the anxiety experienced by those teenage women who are forced
to undergo such procedures).

724

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 8:3

The period of time between parental notification, or a judicial
decision waiving the notification requirement, and the point at which
the abortion procedure is carried out can further complicate an
already difficult situation.47 For example, abortions performed later
during the pregnancy create greater health risks for the pregnant
minor and are often a greater financial burden. 8
One state that has enacted a parental notification statute is
Georgia.4 ' As evidenced by the Georgia statute, this statutory scheme
does not force a minor to gain the consent of a parent or guardian in
order to obtain an abortion. 0 Instead, the statute requires that a
parent or guardian receive adequate notice that his or her minor
47. See Schmidt, supra note 12, at 604 (detailing the complications that may arise by
delaying a minor's access to abortion). A delay in the performance of an abortion may force a
risky and more expensive late term abortion procedure. Id.
48. See Schmidt, supra note 12, at 604 (explaining that late term abortions create a greater
financial burden due to the complications often encountered during these procedures).
49. See GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-112 (1998) (providing a statutory requirement in Georgia
for notification of a parent or guardian when an unemancipated minor seeks an abortion).
The statute provides in pertinent part:
(a) No physician or other person shall perform an abortion upon an
unemancipated minor under the age of 18 years unless:
(1) (A) The minor seeking an abortion shall furnish a statement, signed by a
parent, guardian, or person standing in loco parentis and such minor, stating
that such parent, guardian, or person standing in loco parentis is the lawful
parent or guardian of such minor, or is the person standing in loco parentis of
such minor, and that such parent, guardian, or person standing in loco
parentis, has been notified that an abortion is to be performed on such minor;
or
(B) The physician or an agent gives at least 24 hours' actual notice, in person or
by telephone, to a parent, guardian, or person standing in loco parentis of the
minor, of the pending abortion and the name and address of the place where
the abortion is to be performed; provided, however, that, if the person so
notified indicates that he or she has been previously informed that the minor
was seeking an abortion or if the person so notified has not been previously
informed and he or she clearly expresses that he or she does not wish to consult
with the minor, then in either event the abortion may proceed immediately; or
(C) The physician or an agent gives written notice of the pending abortion and
the address of the place where the abortion is to be performed, sent by regular
mail, addressed to a parent, guardian, or person standing in loco parentis of the
minor at the usual place of abode of the parent, guardian, or person standing
in loco parentis. Unless proof of delivery is otherwise sooner established, such
notice shall be deemed delivered 48 hours after mailing. The time of mailing
shall be recorded by the physician or agent in the minor's file. The abortion
may be performed 24 hours after the delivery of the notice; provided, however,
that, if the person so notified indicates that he or she has been previously
informed that the minor was seeking an abortion or if the person so notified
has not been previously informed and he or she clearly expresses that he or she
does not wish to consult with the minor, then in either event the abortion may
proceed immediately ....
Id.

50. See GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-112(a) (1) (A) (1998) (creating a requirement for
notification rather than consent).
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daughter is seeking an abortion. 5 The Georgia statute requires a
physician to provide notification of a minor's intent to obtain an
abortion in person, by telephone, or by regular mail." In the event
that the physician provides notification in person or by telephone,
the physician must notify the parent at least twenty-four hours in
advance. 3 If the physician provides notification through regular
mail, the statute deems the notification delivered forty-eight hours
after the physician placed it in the mail.54 In either event, the statute
requires at least an additional twenty-four hour waiting period to
obtain the abortion.55 By statute, the physician must wait twenty-four
hours after the delivery of a written notification to perform the
abortion.5 This statute, however, does not provide parents with the
ability to veto a minor's decision to obtain an abortion.57 Rather, the
statute provides a parent with notice of the minor's decision and with
an opportunity to discuss the decision if they so choose.
2. Parental Consent Statutes
Parental consent statutes are more restrictive and require parental
consent before a minor may obtain an abortion, unless the minor
gains the approval of a court to proceed with the operation. 5 States
enacted parental consent statutes soon after Roe v. Wade,59 and the
Supreme Court subsequently reviewed these laws.6° The Supreme
Court's early decisions regarding parental consent statutes expressed
concern that parents could veto a minor's decision to seek an
abortion under some legislative schemes.5 ' The Court held that a
state statute that "imposes a special-consent provision, exercisable by
a person other than the woman and her physician, as a prerequisite
to a minor's termination of her pregnancy and does so without a
sufficient justification for the restriction ...violates the strictures of
51. SeeGA. CODEANN. § 15-11-112(a) (1) (B) (1998).
52. SeeGA. CODEANN. § 15-11-112(a) (1) (B)-(C) (1998).
53. SeeGA. CODEANN. § 15-11-112(a)(1)(B) (1998).
54. SeeGA. CODEANN. § 15-11-112(a) (1) (C) (1998).
55. SeeGA. CODEANN. § 15-11-112(a) (1) (B)-(C) (1998).
56. SeeGA. CODEANN. § 15-11-112(a) (1) (C) (1998).
57. SeeGA. CODEANN. § 15-11-112(a) (1) (B)-(C) (1998).
58. See Schmidt, supranote 12, at 603 (noting the nature of parental consent statutes and
the requirement associated with this type of statute that prevents a minor from obtaining an
abortion without either her parent's consent or ajudicial bypass procedure).
59. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
60. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976) (striking down a state
statute that granted parents veto power over their daughter's decision to seek an abortion).
61. Id. at 74.

726

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 8:3

Roe and Doe."6 2 Because it is unconstitutional to grant one or both
parents veto power over their daughter's abortion decision, the Court
in Bellotti v. Baird ("Bellotti Y-')6" held that state statutes of this type
must provide for a procedure that allows the minor access to an
abortion without her parent's consent or knowledge."
Even though some state statutes contain guidelines to assist parents
in reaching a decision regarding their minor daughter's access to
abortion, parents have, on occasion, based their decisions upon
criteria far removed from the best interests of their daughter.
Indiana, for example, has a parental consent statute.66 This statute,
in keeping with prior case law, provides a mechanism by which a
minor can terminate her pregnancy without obtaining the consent of
a parent. 67 A pregnant teen seeking an abortion in Indiana can avoid
obtaining a parent's consent in one of two ways.s First, the pregnant
62. Id. at 75.
63. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
64. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1979) (establishing the judicial bypass
procedure). Thejudicial bypass procedure is discussed in detail in the Case Law portion of this
comment, infra Part IV.C.
65. See Schmidt, supra note 12, at 603 nn.45-46 (citing cases in which parents based their
consent decision upon religious beliefs and a desire to punish their daughter).
66. IND. CODE § 16-34-2-4 (1998) (prohibiting minors from obtaining an abortion without
the consent of a parent or guardian). The statute provides as follows:
(a) No physician shall perform an abortion on an unemancipated pregnant
woman less than eighteen (18) years of age without first having obtained the
written consent of one (1) of the parents or the legal guardian of the minor
pregnant woman.
(b) A minor:
(1) who objects to having to obtain the written consent of her parent or legal
guardian under this section; or
(2) whose parent or legal guardian refuses to consent to an abortion;
may petition, on her own behalf or by next friend, the juvenile court for a
waiver of the parental consent requirement under subsection (a).
(c) A physician who feels that compliance with the parental consent
requirement in subsection (a) would have an adverse effect on the welfare of
the pregnant minor or on her pregnancy may petition thejuvenile court within
twenty-four (24) hours of the abortion request for waiver of the parental
consent requirement under subsection (a).
(d) The juvenile court must rule on a petition filed by a pregnant minor under
subsection (b) or by her physician under subsection (c) within forty-eight (48)
hours of the filing of the petition. Before ruling on the petition, the court shall
consider the concerns expressed by the pregnant minor and her physician. The
requirement of parental consent under this section shall be waived by the
juvenile court if the court finds that the minor is mature enough to make the
abortion decision independently or that an abortion would be in the minor's
best interests.
Id.
67. SeeIND. CODE § 16-34-2-4(b)-(c) (1998).
68. See id.
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teen can petition the juvenile court herself to obtain a waiver of the
requirement for parental consent. 69 Second, a physician who believes
that obtaining parental consent is either not in the minor's best
interest or that it would adversely effect the pregnancy may request a
waiver of the parental consent requirement on behalf of the
pregnant minor.7 ° In either case, the Indiana statute requires the
juvenile court to rule on the petition for a waiver within forty-eight
hours, thus reducing the likelihood of complications due to delay. 7'
When considering the request for a waiver, the statute instructs the
Indiana juvenile court to determine if the minor is sufficiently
mature to independently decide to terminate her pregnancy.72

IV. CASE LAW
The case law addressing state parental involvement abortion
statutes is riddled with difficult questions and answers. 73 The issues
that weigh in the balance are not easy for courts to reconcile. On the
one side, there is the right of parents to exercise authority over their
children and, on the other side, there are the privacy rights of
minors, coupled with their right of access to abortion.74 Over twenty
years of case law concerning parental notification and consent
statutes provides a better understanding of the criteria necessary for a
state statute to pass constitutional muster.7"

69. SeeIND. CODE § 16-34-2-4(b) (1998).
70. SeeIND. CODE § 16-34-2-4(c) (1998).
71. SeeIND. CODE § 16-34-2-4(d) (1998).
72. See id.
73. See O'Shaughnessy, supra note 9, at 1737 (noting the difficulty courts have had
weighing the issues involved in parental notification statutes, such as the right of parents to
supervise their children, the right of women to obtain an abortion, and the state's right to
protect the welfare of it's citizens).
74. See O'Shaughnessy, supra note 9, at 1737; see also Schmidt, supra note 12, at 603
(proposing that parental involvement statutes have a significant impact on minors and are
tantamount to the denial of access to abortion on the part of minors); Leonard Berman, Note,
PlannedParenthoodv. Casey: Supreme Neglect for UnemancipatedMinors'AbortionRights, 37 HOW. LJ.
577, 603 (1994) (asserting that courts should grant minors the authority to obtain an abortion
without parental involvement); Michael Grimm, Comment, American Academy of Pediatrics v.
Lungren: California'sParentalConsent to Abortion Statute and the Right to Privacy, 25 GOLDEN GATE
U. L. REV. 463, 504-05 (1995) (arguing that parental consent statutes endanger minors' physical
and emotional well being and injure parent-child relationships).
75. See O'Shaugnessy, supra note 9, at 1737-1750 (discussing the history of the case law
concerning parental involvement statutes).
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6

In 1976, the Supreme Court heard arguments in PlannedParenthood
v. Danforth 7 regarding a Missouri statute8 that required a minor to
gain parental consent before she could obtain an abortion. " In
Danforth, two physicians and Planned Parenthood sought declaratory
and injunctive relief relative to a state statute that limited access to
abortions for both married women and minors.0 In addition to
requiring spousal consent for married women, the statute provided
that no abortion could be performed during the first trimester
except: "[w] ith the written consent of one parent or person in loco
parentis of the woman if the woman is unmarried and under the age
of eighteen years, unless the abortion is certified by a licensed
physician as necessary in order to preserve the life of the mother."8'
Due to the timing of the passage of the Missouri statute, Danforth
was one of the first cases to address parental consent statutes.8 2 The
Missouri legislature passed and the Governor approved the parental
consent statute less than two years after Roe.83 Furthermore, the
statute included a provision that made the statute effective
immediately upon approval of the Governor.84 Planned Parenthood
of Central Missouri and two Missouri doctors challenged the statute
only three days after it became effective.5
A threejudge panel of the district court upheld the statute, with
the exception of a specific line that required Missouri physicians to
provide throughout the pregnancy "that degree of professional skill,
care and diligence to preserve the life and health of the fetus' that
'would be required ... to preserve the life and health of any fetus
intended to be born." 8 The
district court denied the plaintiffs'
87
relief.
injunctive
for
request

76. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
77. Id.

78. See id. at 84 (citing the Missouri statute in controversy 1974 Mo. Laws 1211).
79. See id. at 74 (holding that a state does not have the authority to grant a third party the
right to veto a decision regarding abortion).
80. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,57 (1976).
81. See id at84 (citing section 3(4) of the Missouri statute in controversy).
82. Id. at 56.
83. Id.

84. See id- (noting that the statute became effective immediately because it contained an
emergency clause).
85. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,56 (1974).
86. Idat 59.
87. Id. at 60.
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The Supreme Court disagreed and held that under Roe a state
cannot delegate to a spouse the power to veto a woman's decision to
obtain an abortion during the first trimester when the state itself does
not have such a right.' Utilizing the same rationale, the Court held
that provisions requiring a minor to gain the consent of an adult
other than the physician violates Roe."' The Danforth Court stated that
"[c] onstitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically
only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as
well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess
constitutional rights.""0 The Court, however, left room for future
courts to find parental involvement statutes constitutional where they
relate to a "significant state interest."91
B. Bellotti v. Baird 92
9 3 and Bellotti 194 are
The Supreme Court's decisions in Danforth
closely related, and share some procedural history.95 Not only do
these cases share the same dates of argument and decision, they also
share the Court's concern that the challenged state statutes each
create a parental veto.99 The primary issue in Bellotti I was whether
the Federal District Court for the District of Massachusetts should
have abstained from rendering a decision regarding the
constitutionality of a parental consent statute until after the state
courts had addressed the constitutionality of the statute first. 97 In

88. See id at 69 (citingRoe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
89. Seeid (citingRoe 410 U.S. at 165).
90. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,74 (1976).
91. 1& at 75 (concluding that while minors may have constitutional rights, legislation that
may impact these rights will not run afoul of the Constitution if it promotes a significant state
interest).
92. 428 U.S. 132 (1976) [hereinafter Bellotti 1];443 U.S. 622 (1979) [hereinafter Bellotti BI].
93. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
94. See Bellotti I, 428 U.S. at 132 (holding that the District Court, which had invalidated the
statute in question as unconstitutional, should have certified to the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court appropriate questions concerning the meaning of the 1974 statute and the
procedure it imposes).
95. Id. at 147; Danforth, 428 U.S. at 52. The parties argued both cases on the same day,
March 23, 1976, and the court decided them both on the same day, July 1, 1976. Furthermore,
these cases share a concern that the statutes create a parental veto power over abortion
decisions made by a minor pregnant woman and her physician. Bellotti I, 428 U.S. at 151;
Danforth,428 U.S. at 74.
96. Seesupra notes 76-91, and accompanying text (discussing the Danforthdecision).
97. See Bellotti , 428 U.S. at 146-47 (holding that the District Court should have abstained
from making a determination regarding the constitutionality of a state statute because the state
courts had not yet had an opportunity to hear the matter themselves). The Massachusetts
statute (Mass. Acts and Resolves 1974, c. 706, S1, amended MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, by
adding §§ 12H-12R) provided that:
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Bellotti I, the Supreme Court held that the district court should have
abstained from determining the constitutionality of the statute and
certified to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court questions
regarding the subject statute.98 Consequently, the Court vacated the
district court's decision and remanded the case back to the district
court.99

On remand, the District Court for the District of Massachusetts
certified nine questions to the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts that focused on particular portions of the statute. l°
If the mother is less than eighteen years of age and has not married, the
consent of both the mother and her parents [to an abortion to be performed
on the mother] is required. If one or both of the mother's parents refuse such
consent, consent may be obtained by order of ajudge of the superior court for
good cause shown, after such hearing as he deems necessary. Such a heating
will not require the appointment of a guardian for the mother, If one of the
parents has died or has deserted his or her family, consent by the remaining
parent is sufficient If both parents have died or have deserted their family,
consent of the mother's guardian or other person having duties similar to a
guardian, or any person who had assumed the care and custody of the mother is
sufficient.
Id at 134-35.
98. Id. at 151-52.
99. Id.
100. SeeBelottiHi, 443 U.S. 622, 629 n. 9 (1979) (focusing on chapter 112, section 12S of the
statute [hereinafter 12S] listing the questions that the district court certified to the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts). These questions were:
(1) What standards, if any, does the statute establish for a parent to apply when
considering whether or not to grant consent?
(a) Is the parent to consider "exclusively... what will serve the child's best
interests?"
(b) If the parent is not limited to considering exclusively the minor's best
interests, can the parent take into consideration the "long-term
consequences to the family and her parents' marriage relationship?"
(c) Other?
(2) What standard or standards is the Superior Court to apply?
(a) Is the Superior Court to disregard all parental objections that are not
based exclusively on what would serve the minor's best interests?
(b) If the Superior Court finds that the minor is capable, and has, in fact, made
and adhered to an informed and reasonable decision to have an abortion,
may the court refuse its consent based on a finding that a parent's, or its
own, contrary decision is a better one?
(c)

Other?

(3)

Does the Massachusetts law permit a minor (a) "capable of giving informed
consent" (b) "incapable of giving informed consent," "to obtain [a court]
order without parental consultation?"
(4) If the court answers any of question 3 in the affirmative, may the Superior Court,
for good cause shown, enter an order authorizing an abortion, (a) without prior
notification to the parents, and (b) without subsequent notification?
(5)

Will the Supreme Judicial Court prescribe a set of procedures to implement c.
112, [§ 12S] which will expedite the application, hearing, and decision phases of
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The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held in part that the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts could not require a minor to gain
parental consent before proceeding with an abortion when a court
could determine that such consent was not in the minor's best
interest.'0 ' Furthermore, the court held that the statute improperly
allowed ajudge to reject a minor's decision to seek an abortion when
a court has already determined that the minor is capable of providing
informed consent.012 Finally, the court found that the statute was
defective because it did not advise parents that they must base their
decision regarding consent solely upon the minor's best interest.9'
Once the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts made a
determination regarding the constitutionality of the statute, the
District Court for the District of Massachusetts was left to decide if it
should attempt to repair the statute. 04 Rather than attempt to repair
the statute, that court opted to assume the holding it previously
issued regarding 12S, declared the statute unconstitutional and
enjoined enforcement of the statute.' 5 The attorney general, Francis
Bellotti, subsequently appealed this decision, and the Supreme Court
once again agreed to review the decision of the lower court.'0
In Bellotti II, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
district court and agreed that, though it satisfied constitutional
standards in large part, significant provisions contained in 12S were
unconstitutional 7 in two respects. First, one portion of the statute
the Superior Court proceeding provided there under appeal?
(6)

To what degree do the standards and procedures set forth in c. 112, § 12F (Stat.
1975, c. 564), authorizing minors to give consent to medical and dental care in
specific circumstances, parallel the grounds and procedures for showing good
cause under c. 112, [12S]?

(7)

May a minor, upon showing of indigency, have court-appointed counsel?

(8) Is it a defense to his criminal prosecution if a physician performs an abortion
solely with the minor's own, valid consent, that he reasonably, and in good faith,
though erroneously, believed that she was eighteen or more years old or had
been married?
(9)

Will the court make any other comments about the statute which, in its opinion,
might assist us in determining whether it infringes on the United States
Constitution?

Id.
101. See id at 632 (citations omitted).
102. Id.
103. See id (concluding that such an omission constituted "formal overbreadth").
104. Id. at 632-33.
105. Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 633.
106. Id.
107. See id. at 651 (noting that, though the statute satisfies constitutional standards in large
part, section 12S falls short of constitutional standards).
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held unconstitutional was the provision that allowed for judicial
consent for an abortion to be withheld even when the minor had
been found to possess the requisite maturity to make the decision to
seek an abortion."" A second unconstitutional portion of the
Massachusetts statute was a provision that required a minor seeking
an abortion to discuss her intention with her parents in every
instance.'"' In affirming the lower court's decision, which found 12S
unconstitutional, the Court articulated a judicial bypass procedure
that must be included in state statutes which seek to regulate a
minor's access to abortion."'
The Court held that the statute could not force a minor to consult
her parents when she seeks an abortion."' Instead, statutes which
regulate a minor's access to abortion procedures must allow the
minor to appear before a court without having to first notify her
parents.
In this appearance, if the minor is able to demonstrate
that she is duly informed of the risks associated with the procedure,
and that she possesses the requisite maturity to make an independent
decision to seek an abortion, then the court must allow her to
proceed with the procedure without the notice or consent of her
parents." 3 However, if she is not able to demonstrate the requisite
maturity to make an independent decision, she can still show that an
abortion is in her best interest."' Only when the minor also fails in
this regard can the court properly withhold consent to proceed with
the operation and force the minor to gain the consent of her
parents.115
C. H. L. v. Matheson

16

In a continuing movement toward limiting a minor's ability to
obtain an abortion without the involvement of parents and further

108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 647 (detailing the "judicial bypass" procedure which allows a
pregnant minor to obtain an abortion without consulting her parents).
111. See id.(opining that young pregnant minors, especially those living at home, are
particularly vulnerable to their parents' efforts to obstruct both an abortion and access to

courts).
112. See id. (noting that going to court is up to the minor).
113. Id.
114. Id. at647-48.
115. See Bellotti I, 443 U.S. at 648 (commenting that the court "may decline to sanction the
abortion," indicating that even if the minor falls to meet the maturity and best interest tests, the
court still has the option to allow the abortion).
116. 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
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establishing the necessity of the judicial bypass procedure, the
Supreme Court upheld a Utah statute 1' 7 that required a physician to
notify, if possible, the parents of a minor who is seeking to have an
abortion. 8 In Matheson, an unmarried pregnant minor, who was a
dependent of her parents, sought the advice of her physician in
terminating her pregnancy.
While her physician agreed that an
abortion was in the minor's "best medical interest" he insisted on
notifying her parents before performing the abortion.'
The minor,
however, believed that her interests would be better served by
undergoing the procedure without notifying her parents. 2 ' In
pursuit of this interest, the minor filed an action in the District Court
of Utah seeking a declaratory judgment finding the statute
unconstitutional and an injunction prohibiting the enforcement of
the statute. 22 The district court upheld the statute, and on appeal
the Supreme Court of Utah unanimously upheld the statute.2 '
The statute in question required parental notification when a
minor child intended to obtain an abortion, 124 whereas, the statutes
before the Court in Danforth 2 and Bellotti I 2 both required the
consent of one or both parents. Consequently, the problems noted
by the Court in both Danforth and Bellotti II concerning state statutes

117. Id. at 399 (citing UTAH CODEANN. § 76-7-304 (1974)). The statute provided:
To enable the physician to exercise his best medical judgment [in considering a

possible abortion], he shall:
(1) Consider all factors relevant to the well-being of the woman upon whom the
abortion is to be performed including, but not limited to,

Her physical, emotional and psychological health and safety,
Her age,
Her familial situation.
(2) Notify, if possible, the parents or guardian of the woman upon whom the
abortion is to be performed, if she is a minor or the husband of the woman, if
she is married.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-304 (1974).
118. See H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (upholding UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-304
(1974)).
119. Id.at399.
120. See id at 401 (stating that the physician refused to perform the abortion because of the
statute).
121. See id. (stating that the appellant desired an abortion "for her own reasons").
122. Id.
123. See H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (the latter court holding that the statute
serves "significant state interests[s]" that are present with respect to minors, but absent in the
case of adult women).
124. See UTAH CODEANN. § 76-7-304 (1974).
125. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976).
126. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 625 (1979).
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that gave one or both parents the power to veto their daughter's
decision to seek an abortion, were not present. 27 The statute
circumvented the consent issue by requiring only that parents be
notified, if possible, and by not requiring that the28minor seeking the
abortion gain the consent of one or both parents.
In Matheson, the Supreme Court ultimately upheld the statute
finding that although "the requirement of notice to parents may
inhibit some minors from seeking abortions [such possible
inhibition] is not a valid basis to void the statute as applied to
appellant and the class properly before us."

29

The Court further held

that the statute served an important state interest of protecting
potential life and that the statute was narrowly drawn to serve this
legitimate state interest. 3 '
D. Planned Parenthood v. Casey""
Like cases before it, Planned Parenthood v. Casey 2 involved a
challenge to a state statute before the statute even took effect. 3' In
Casey, five abortion clinics, and a physician representing himself as
well as a class of physicians, filed suit seeking a judgment declaring
that five provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of
1990'4 were unconstitutional and sought injunctive relief enjoining
enforcement of the statute. 5 The district court held this Act
unconstitutional and granted injunctive relief, thus enjoining
enforcement of the statute. 36 The court of appeals reversed part of
the lower court's decision by declaring the provision requiring
notification of a woman's husband unconstitutional, while upholding
the remaining provisions in the statute." 7
127. See Matheson, 450 U.S. at 408-09 (explaining differences between Bellotti II and
Matheson); see also Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74; Bellotti I, 443 U.S. at 632.
128. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-304 (1974).
129. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 413.
130. See id (assuring that the statute "does not violate any guarantees of the Constitution").
131. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 845.
134. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3203, 3205, 3206,3207(b), 3209, 3214(a), and 3214(f) (1990).
135. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845 (1992).
136. Id.
137. See id. (upholding the other four provisions which: (1) mandate that a woman seeking
an abortion give her informed consent prior to the procedure and that she is provided with
certain information 24 hours before the procedure; (2) require informed consent of one
parent if the woman seeking the abortion is a minor, with the availability ofjudicial bypass; (3)
define medical emergency to excuse compliance with the foregoing requirements; and (4)
delineate requirements for certain reporting procedures for facilities providing abortions).
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In Casey, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its decision in Roe,'38 but
held that the undue burden test-rather than the strict trimester
framework-should apply when evaluating restrictions to abortion
before viability.' 9 After reaffirming Roe, the Court proceeded to
overturn the part of the Pennsylvania statute that required a woman
seeking an abortion to gain the consent of her spouse before
proceeding with the operation.'4 ° The Court upheld a provision of
the statute that required minors seeking an abortion to obtain the
informed consent of one parent.' 4' The Court held that "[a] State
may require a minor seeking an abortion to obtain the consent of a
parent or guardian, provided that there is an adequate judicial bypass
procedure."
The petitioners argued, however, that the consent
provision contained in § 3206 was invalid because it requires
informed consent. 143 In ruling on this argument, the Court held that
informed consent "[c]annot be considered a substantial obstacle to
obtaining an abortion, and, it follows, there is no undue burden."44
Casey further established the power of state legislatures to require
the consent of a parent when a minor seeks an abortion so long as
there is a judicial bypass procedure.
Furthermore, this case
expanded the validity of the consent requirement in that a minor
can, not only be forced to gain the simple consent of a parent before
obtaining an abortion, but can also be forced to gain the informed
consent of a parent.'46 This case limits abortion rights for both
minors and adults in two regards. First, the Supreme Court endorsed
the power of state legislatures to require informed consent.'47 This

138. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Casey, the Court stressed that the factual
underpinnings of Roe regarding viability are still valid. Casey, 505 U.S. at 860
139. Casey, 505 U.S. at 876 (stating that the undue burden standard is appropriate for
reconciling the state's interest with the woman's liberty interests). The Court also reaffirmed in
Casey that viability is the key to triggering state interest, whether occurring at 28 weeks, 23 to 24
weeks, or even earlier. Id.
140. See id. at 898 (declaring that women do not lose their constitutionally protected liberty
when they marry).
141. Id. at 899.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 883 (1992) (articulating the
constitutionality of informed consent provisions in abortion statutes under the "undue burden"
test). The Court reasoned that "[blecause the informed consent requirement facilitates the
wise exercise of [the right to terminate a pregnancy free of undue interference by the State], it
cannot be classified as an interference with the right Roe protects." Id at887.
145. Id. at 899.
146. See id. (giving as an example of informed consent, the waiting period, which may allow
parent and child to discuss the consequences of the decision).
147. Id.

736

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 8:3

type of consent requires more parental involvement because parents
are required to meet with medical personnel to be apprised of the
necessary information so that informed parental consent can be
granted. "8
Second, by abandoning the trimester framework
originally established under Roe, and adopting the undue burden test
in its place, the Court cleared the way for legislatures to place
restrictions on abortion during the first trimester given that the
restriction is not an undue burden.
E. Lambert v. Wicklund' 50
In one of its most recent decisions regarding parental involvement
statutes, Lambert v. Wicklund,"'5 the Supreme Court reviewed a
Montana statute' which included a waiver of the notice requirement
that differs from the judicial bypass procedure articulated in Bellotti
iLs 3 Both physicians who perform abortions and other members of
the Montana medical community immediately challenged this varied
construction of a judicial bypass procedure.5 4 In their complaint,
they sought a judicial finding that the statute was unconstitutional
and requested injunctive relief enjoining enforcement of the
statute.'
The District Court for the District of Montana found the
statute to be unconstitutional because sections 50-20-212(4)-(5) were
148. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3205 (1990) (defining informed consent).
149. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 876 (providing for an undue burden test rather than the
complete ban on restrictions on abortion provided for under Roe, thus enabling the enactment
of statutes that place restrictions on the access to abortion if such restrictions do not create an
undue burden).
150. 117 S. Ct. 1169 (1997).
151. Id.
152. See id at 1173 (citing MONT. CODEANN. § 50-20-212 (1995)). The relevant portions are
as follows:
(4) If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner is
sufficiently mature to decide whether to have an abortion, the court shall issue
an order authorizing the minor to consent to the performance or inducement
without the notification of a parent or guardian.
(5) The court shall issue an order authorizing the petitioner to consent to an
abortion without the notification of a parent or guardian if the court finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, that:
there is evidence of a pattern of physical, sexual, or emotional abuse of the
petitioner by one or both parents, guardian, or a custodian; or
the notification of a parent or guardian is not in the best interests of the
petitioner.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-212 (1995).
153. See Lambert v. Wicklund, 117 S. Ct. 1169, 1170 (1997) (expanding upon the judicial
bypass criteria set forth in Beliotti II).
154. Id.
155. Id.
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too narrow. 5 6 This court held that the judicial bypass procedure
required that the waiver of notice was authorized "whenever 'the
abortion would be in the minor's best interest,' not just when

'notification would not be in the minor's best interests.",157 The court
58

of appeals upheld the decision of the district court.
While the Court in Bellotti If"s
first explicated the criteria of the
judicial bypass procedure, the Court in Lambert' 60 held that a court
can waive a state notice requirement if there is clear and convincing
evidence that the minor is mature enough to make the decision
independently, if there is evidence that the minor is a victim of
"physical, sexual, or emotional abuse '' 6' by a parent or guardian, or

that the notification is not in the minor's best interest.162 Unlike
prior Court decisions, the decision in Lambert held that a court can
consider the minor's best interests in relationship to both the
abortion and to the notification of a parent.'
Thus this decision
expands the rights of a minor seeking to obtain an abortion after
previous Court decisions limited those rights.'TM
F. Summary of Cases
The result of the Supreme Court cases addressing parental
involvement statutes is that the rights of pregnant minor women have
been given greater definition and have been narrowed in relation to
the rights of pregnant women who have reached the age of
majority.' 65 While the first decisions defined parental power in terms
of the limitations of governmental power, later decisions shaped
judicial mechanisms that allow minors to rely on a court's authority
to permit them access to abortion procedures without either

156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Lambert, 117 S. Ct. at 1170.
159. Bellotti/, 443 U.S. 622, 632 (1979).
160. Lambert, 117 S. CL at 1170.
161. See id. (quoting the Montana statute that creates ajudicial bypass to the state's parental
notification statute).
162. Id.
163. Compare Bellotti H, 443 U.S. at 113 (restricting minor's access to abortion), with Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (finding a Pennsylvania statute requiring consent of
one parent when a minor wishes to have an abortion), and H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398
(1981) (upholding a Utah statute that required parental notification when a minor seeks an
abortion).
164. See cases cited supra note 163.
165. See Schmidt, supra note 12, at 603 (relaying the difficulties minors face when
confronted with the decisions regarding pregnancy).
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notifying their parents or obtaining ,their parent's consent.'66 As a
result, these decisions have made the lives of many pregnant minors
more difficult. The decisions, however, also established a mechanism
to avoid potentially vindictive and abusive parental action when
seeking a parent's permission to obtain an abortion. While the
judicial bypass procedure may provide a way around obtaining
parental consent, many pregnant minors may be fearful of seeking
the assistance of attorneys and the court. ' While the Supreme Court
is willing to weigh the impact of domestic violence on a married
woman's decision to seek an abortion, the Court has only recently
recognized such criteria as abuse and neglect when determining
whether it is in a minor's best interest to notify her parents when
seeking an abortion.ss
Although the Supreme Court has held that parental involvement
statutes are valid and have in fact shaped this area of the law, these
statutes may contribute to negative societal trends. 6 " In fact, after the
enactment of parental involvement statutes in some states, the
abortion statistics for minors in the surrounding states increased.' 0
166. See Lambert v. Wicklund, 117 S. Ct. 1169, 1170 (1997) (permitting courts to consider
whether access to an abortion is in a minor's best interest as to the abortion and to the
notification of her parent); Casey, 505 U.S. at 860-61, 877 (holding that an undue burden test
applies to restrictions on abortions rather than a complete ban on any restrictions on access to
abortion during the first trimester); Matheson, 450 U.S. at 413 (upholding a state statute that
requires notification of the parents of a pregnant teenager before permitting the procedure);
Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 647 (establishing the judicial bypass procedure); Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 426 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (articulating state powers as related to restricting the vetoing
of abortion decisions).
167. See Veith, supra note 37, at 453-57 (discussing the shortcomings and burdensome
nature of the judicial bypass procedure). The problems with judicial bypass procedures emerge
from their very nature. Id. These procedures seek to make a determination as to maturity on
an individual basis, yetjudges rarely deny a pregnant teenager access to abortion even if she is
found to be immature. Id. at 458. In addition, judicial bypass procedures cause a fearful
pregnant teenager to be even more fearful. Id. at 460-61. These procedures require a teenager
who is already afraid of revealing her pregnancy to her parents to appear before a court to be
granted permission to have an abortion. Id. For a pregnant teenager, the prospect of
appearing before a judge who will be attempting to ascertain her level of maturity and who
ultimately has the power to deny her access to an abortion is at the very least frightening. Id.
Moreover, judicial bypass procedures result in delays which may result in complications during
the administration of an abortion. Id. Given that judicial bypass procedures almost always
result in the pregnant teen being granted permission to have an abortion and that these
procedures cause the teen to be more fearful and experience delays in obtaining an abortion it
is unclear why these procedures have became so widespread. Id.
168. SeeLambert, 117 S. Ct. at 1169 (overturning a provision in a state statute that required a
married woman to obtain the consent of her spouse when seeking an abortion based upon fears
of an abusive reprisal while only touching on such concerns related to minors).
169. See Merritt, supra note 11, at 443 (proposing that parental involvement statutes seek to
force minors to carry their pregnancies to term and thus fall victim to the many difficulties and
complications associated with teenage motherhood).
170. See Bryan Howard, Abortion Consent Presents Hazards,ARIZ. REPUB., Apr. 23, 1998, at B5
(providing statistical support that confirms that becoming a mother during teenage years leads
to a lifetime of struggle and difficulties).
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Furthermore, there is extensive evidence to suggest that minors who
have children are at an extreme disadvantage for the remainder of
their lives.' 7' In addition, children born to teenage mothers are at a
disadvantage when compared to children born to mothers in their
twenties." 2
V. THE CHILD CUSTODY PROTECTION ACT

(CCPA)173

On July 15, 1998, the House of Representatives passed House
Resolution 3682.74 This resolution is intended to supplement
statutes that are in place in several states which require that parents

171. See Schmidt, supra note 12, at 600.
172. See Schmidt, supra note 12, at 600 (reporting that teenage mothers are more likely than
mothers in their twenties to depend on welfare).
173. H.R. 3682, 105th Cong. (1998).
174. The resolution amends title 18 of the United States Code, stating in part:
OFFENSE. -

(1) GENERALLY. - Except as provided in subsection (b), whoever knowingly
transports an individual who has not attained the age of 18 years across a State
line, with the intent that such individual obtain an abortion, and thereby in fact
abridges the right of a parent under a law, requiring parental involvement in a
minor's abortion decision, of the State where the individual resides, shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
(2) DEFINITION. - For the purposes of this subsection, an abridgement of the
right of a parent occurs if an abortion is performed on the individual, in a State
other than the State where the individual resides, without the parental consent
or notification, or the judicial authorization, that would have been required by
that law had the abortion been performed in the State where the individual
resides.
(b) EXCEPTIONS.- (1) The prohibition of subsection (a) does not apply if the
abortion was necessary to save the life of the minor because her life was
endangered by a physical disorder, physical injury, or physical illness, including
a life endangering physical condition caused by or arising from the pregnancy
itself.
(2) An individual transported in violation of this section, and any parent of that
individual, may not be prosecuted or sued for a violation of this section, a
conspiracy to violate this section, or an offense under section 2 or 3 based on a
violation of this section.
(c) AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE. - It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution for
an offense, or to a civil action, based on a violation of this section that the
defendant reasonably believed, based on information the defendant obtained
directly from a parent of the individual or other compelling facts, that before
the individual obtained the abortion, the parental consent or notification, or
judicial authorization took place that would have been required by the law
requiring parental involvement in a minor's abortion decision, had the
abortion been performed in the Sate where the individual resides.
(d) CIVIL ACTION. - Any parent who suffers legal harm from a violation of
subsection (a) may obtain appropriate relief in a civil action.
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or guardians provide consent or are notified of their minor child's
5
intention to obtain an abortion.'
A. CCPA: TheAct
In April 1998, the CCPA was introduced in the House of
Representatives. The CCPA proposed to amend title 18 of the
United States Code to "[pirohibit taking minors across State lines to
avoid laws requiring the involvement of parents in abortion
decisions.', 76 Prior to this federal proposal, twenty-two states had
already enacted laws requiring a minor seeking an abortion to either
notify a parent of her intent, or to gain the consent of a parent or
judge prior to having an abortion.' 7 In support of the CCPA, pro-life
members of the House of Representatives claim that the Act
reinforces the family by encouraging young women who are
contemplating an abortion to discuss the matter with their parents."8
1. Legislative History
Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen of Florida introduced the
CCPA on April 1, 1998.7 9 On that same day, the bill was referred to
the House Committee on the Judiciary."0 The bill was then reported,
after being amended, to the Committee on the Judiciary on June 23,
199828' After being duly considered by both the Committee on the
Judiciary and the Subcommittee on the Constitution, the bill was
reported to the House of Representatives via House Report 105605. '82
In its report, the Committee on the Judiciary stated that "H.R. 3682
is designed to protect state laws which safeguard minor girls' physical
and emotional health by ensuring parental involvement in their
abortion decision."'8u The report frames the purpose and intent of
175. H.R. REP. No. 105-605, at 11 (1998).
176. Id. at 11.
177. See T.R. Goldman, PuttingTeeth in ParentalConsent Laws, 152 N.J. L. 856, June 1, 1998,

at 8 (detailing and commenting upon the Child Custody Protection Act and the laws and
motivations that gave rise to this legislation).
178. See id&(arguing that parents have a right to be informed about the most intimate
decisions of their children, especially those involving medical procedures).
179. See Bill Summary and Status for the 105th Congress, H.R 3682 (visited Feb. 15, 2000)

<http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/D?dIO5:1:./temp/-bdpMWo:@@@
L1/bss/dl05query.htmll> (detailing the actions taken on the Child Custody Protection Act in
the House of Representatives).
180. See id.

181. Id.
182. H.R. REP.No. 105-605 (1998).
183. Id.atl.
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the bill as protecting pregnant teens from health and safety risks by
reinforcing family relationships. 84 Furthermore, the two principal
purposes of the Act are to protect the rights of parents to be involved
in their daughters' medical decisions and to protect minors' health
and safety by encouraging compliance with state parental
involvement statutes.18' The House Report cites several people who
testified in favor of the CCPA before the Subcommittee on the
Constitution.'88 One person who testified before the subcommittee
was Professor Teresa Collett of the South Texas College of Law' In
her testimony, Professor Collett voiced her support of the CCPA
because transporting a minor in an effort to avoid state parental
involvement statutes "interferes with parental authority in the
household and with the parental responsibility to direct the rearing
of their child."'t Mothers of teenage women who obtained an out-ofstate abortion to avoid a parental involvement statute also testified in
support of the bill."' These mothers supported the bill primarily
because their pregnant teens experienced complications after
obtaining an abortion.'
Throughout the House Report, there are
numerous references to physicians as "abortionists" and to the rights
of parents, rather than the rights of pregnant teens.' 9' Given the tone
and language used by the majority in the House Report, it is evident
that this Act was written, sponsored and supported by members of
the House who are sympathetic to and supportive of the pro-life
movement.
Ultimately, the House bill passed by a vote of 276 to 150 on July 15,
1998. 92 Once passed by the House of Representatives, the Act was
forwarded to the Senate for consideration.'9 3
184. Id. at 12.
185. See id. at 13 (explaining that when parents are not involved, the health risks suffered by
minor girls significantly increase).
186. H.R. REP. No. 105-605, at 13-14 (1998).
187. Id. at 12.
188. Id
189. See id. at 13 (relating the testimony of one mother of a minor girl who reported how
her 12-year-old daughter was provided alcohol, raped, and then taken out of state by the rapists'
mother for an abortion).
190. See id. at 14 (describing the physical examination of a 13-year-old girl whose abortion
had been incompletely performed and who "required surgery to repair the damage done by the
abortionist").
191. See H.R REP. No. 105-605, at 11 (1998) (stating that one of two major goals of the
legislation is "to protect the rights of parents to be involved in the medical decisions of their
minor daughters").
192. See Bill Summary and Statusfor the 105th Congress, H.R 3682, supranote 179 (providing
details related to actions taken in relation to the Child Custody Protection Act).
193. See Bill Summary and Statusfor the 105th Congress, HA 3682,supranote 179.
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The Senate, however, was considering their own version of the
CCPA.'4 Senator Abraham introduced the Senate version of the
CCPA on February 12, 1998.195
After being referred to the
Committee on the Judiciary, committee hearings were held on May
20, 1998.'g' Once committee hearings and mark up sessions were
held, the Committee on the Judiciary-by a vote of ten to six-voted in
favor of the CCPA and reported it out via Senate Report 105-268.'
B. ConstitutionalConflicts
Even if the CCPA passes, it is unclear whether it will pass
Constitutional muster in light of previous Supreme Court rulings.
First, the Court's decision in United States v. Lopez 9' may render the
CCPA unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.' Under Lopez,
if the Court finds that the CCPA burdens interstate commerce, the
Court will apply a balancing test to weigh the minor's right to
abortion access with the burden placed on interstate commerce.20
Second, the resolution may violate Roe, and would thus be
unconstitutional.2 1' Finally, the CCPA may run afoul of the privileges
194. SeeS. REP. No. 105-268 (1998).
195. S. 1645, 105th Cong. (1998). The bill provides in part
(a) OFFENSES. - Except as provided in subsection (b), whoever knowingly
transports an individual who has not attained the age of 18 years across a State
line, with the intent such individual obtain an abortion, if in fact the
requirements of a law, requiring parental involvement in a minor's abortion
decision, in the State where the individual resides, are not met before the
individual obtains the abortion, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than one year, or both.
(b) EXCEPTION. - The prohibition of subsection (a) does not apply if the
abortion was necessary to save the life of the minor because her life was
endangered by a physical disorder, physical injury, or physical illness, including
a life endangering physical condition caused by or arising from the pregnancy
itself.
(c) CIVIL ACTION. - Any parent or guardian who suffers legal harm from a
violation of subsection (a) may obtain appropriate relief in a civil action.
Id.
196. See Bill Summary and Status for the 105th Congress, S. 1645 (visited Feb. 15, 2000)

<http://thomas.Ioc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d1l5:SNO1645:@@@Ll/bss/dIO5query.htmll>
(detailing the actions taken on the CCPA in the Senate).
197. Id. The Senate report contains passages that are identical to the House Report 105605. Id. In fact, it appears that the Senate Committee on the Judiciary heard from the same
witnesses as the House of Representative's Subcommittee on the Constitution. Id.
198. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
199. See id. at 559-61 (limiting the ability of Congress to enact legislation under the
Commerce Clause).
200. See id at 561-62 (describing the balancing test and its application to interstate
commerce).
201. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The decision in Roe established the right of a
woman to make decisions regarding abortion without the interference of state or federal
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and immunities clause found in Article IV of the Constitution.2 In
addition to the constitutional problems, the CCPA has received sharp
criticism from members of Congress. Congresswoman Nita Lowey,
for example, argues that "[t]his bill is unnecessary, and it is
dangerous. Already, most young women - more than 75%, in 20fact
3
involve one or both parents in the decision to seek an abortion."
1. United States v. Lopez
In 1990, Congress passed the Gun-Free School Zones Act (the
"Act"), which made it a federal offense to possess a firearm in a
school zone. °5 Initially, Lopez was arrested and charged with
violation of a Texas State law for possession of a gun.0 6 These
charges were later dismissed, however, and he was subsequently
charged with violation of the Gun-Free School Zones Act. 0 7 After
being charged with violating the federal statute, Lopez was indicted
by a federal grand jury for "knowing possession of a firearm at a
school zone." ' After Lopez was indicted, he moved for a dismissal of
the charges on the ground that the Gun-Free School Zones Act was
unconstitutional because regulation of schools is not within
2
congressional powerY.
The district court, however, denied Lopez's
motion, ruling that the Act was a constitutional exercise of
congressional power since it regulated activities that affect interstate
commerce.' Subsequently, the district court found Lopez guilty and
legislatures or courts during the first trimester of pregnancy. Id. at 163. The CCPA, however,
reinforces state statutes that place restrictions on a teenager's access to abortion during the first
trimester. H.R. REP. No. 3682, 105th Cong. (1998).
202. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2; see also Seth F. Kreimer, "But Whoever TreasuresFreedom...":
The Right to Travel and ExtraterritorialAbortions, 91 MICH. L. REv. 907, 916 (1993) [hereinafter
Kreimer, Right to Travel] (addressing the right of interstate travel as it relates to abortion); Seth
F. Kreimer, The Law of Choice and Choice of Law: Abortion, the Right to Travel, and Extraterritorial
Regulation in American Federalism,67 N.Y.U.L. REV. 451,508 (1992) [hereinafter Kreimer, Law of
Choice] (discussing constitutional issues related to extraterritorial abortion laws).
203. See PreparedStatement by Congresswoman Nita M. Lowey Before the HouseJudiciaryCommittee,
Subcommittee on Constitution, FED. NEWs SERV., May 21, 1998 (explaining her belief that family
communication and open and honest parent-child relationships cannot be legislated).
204. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
205. See id.
at 551 (citing the Gun-Free School Zones Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1) (A) (1988
ed., Supp. V).
206. See id.
207. See id. (indicating that Lopez was a 12th grade student who arrived at school carrying a
concealed .38 caliber handgun and five bullets).
208. Id.
209. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995).
210. Id. at 551-52. The government's brief argued that "the costs of violent crime are
substantial, and, through the mechanism of insurance, those costs are spread throughout the
population." Id. at 563-64. The government also argued that "violent crime reduces the
willingness of individuals to travel to areas within the country that are perceived to be unsafe."
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sentenced him to six-months in jail and two years of probation. " '
Lopez appealed his conviction and again asserted that the Act was
unconstitutional in that it exceeded the congressional power to enact
legislation under the Commerce Clause." 2 The court of appeals
agreed with Lopez and overturned his conviction, finding the GunFree School Zones Act invalid because it was "beyond the power of
Congress under the Commerce Clause.", 13

The Supreme Court

affirmed the ruling of the court of appeals holding that "[t]he
possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic
activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect
any sort of interstate commerce."2 14 The Court further stated that the
Act "is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with
'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one
might define those terms."

215

The impact of the holding in Lopez is that the Court reaffirmed the
notion that statutes enacted into law by the legislative branch must
"substantially affect" interstate commerce. 216 Furthermore, the Court
held that a statute that is criminal in nature cannot be made valid by
enacting it under the rubric of the Commerce Clause.2 7 This decision
also prevents the legislative branch from expanding its power beyond
that enumerated in the Constitution.2 8 Instead, the Supreme Court
elected not to expand the power of Congress, and thus affirmed the
decision of the court of appeals and held the Gun-Free School Zone
Act unconstitutional. 19

Id. at 564.
211. Id.at 552.

212. See id (arguing that possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an
economic activity that substantially affects interstate commerce).
213. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993).
214. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (overturning the Gun-Free School
Zones Act via a plurality formed by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas).
215. See id. at 561 (stating that section 922(q) of the Gun-Free School Zone Act is not an
essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity unless intrastate activity was also
regulated).
216. Id.at 567.
217. See generally id. at 561 n.3.

218. See id. at 567 (stating that to uphold the government's claim, the Court would have had
to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would convert congressional authority under
the Commerce Clause into a general police power of the sort retained by the states).
219. Id.
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2. Balancing Test
The decision in Lopez has a direct impact upon the CCPA currently
before Congress.
In the CCPA, ° Congress is attempting to
criminalize an act under the guise of the Commerce Clause, even
though the practice of transporting a minor across state lines to
obtain an abortion does not "substantially affect" interstate
commerce as is required by Lopez. 22' The practice of enacting
legislation that is constructed under the Commerce Clause "will
always engender 'legal uncertainty.' 22 The Supreme Court has been
willing to uphold statutes that regulate commercial transactions when
223
those transactions have been shown to affect interstate commerce.
The regulated transaction here, however, is not one that is primarily
commercial. 4 Through the CCPA,225 Congress is attempting to use
the Commerce Clause to regulate a right recognized and protected
by the Supreme Court.226 Even though the act of transporting a
person across state lines is a commercial activity, it must be shown
that the benefit of preventing teen abortion without parental or
judicial involvement
outweighs the burden placed upon interstate
27
commerce.2

220. H.R. 3682, 105th Cong. (1998).
221. Id.
222. See Lope, 514 U.S. at 566 (discussing Justice Breyer's dissent and his assertion that a
broad range of activities can be deemed to fall under the purview of Congress through the
Commerce Clause).
223. See, e.g., Jones v. Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (finding that the manufacturing
operations of a large steel company organized on a national scale and drawing materials from
other states had a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce).
224. The act of a private individual transporting a pregnant teenager across a state border
to obtain an abortion is not a commercial activity in the same manner that the interstate
transportation of individuals by bus, train, and airline companies is commercial. See, e.g.,
Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946) (upholding the constitutionality of the Mann
Act, making it an offense to transport in interstate commerce any woman or girl for
debauchery, prostitution, or any other "immoral" purpose).
225. H.R. 3682, 105th Cong. (1998).
226. See, e.g., Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292 (1997) (upholding judicial bypass
provision allowing waiver of notice requirement if notification was not in the minor's best
interest); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (reaffirming a woman's right to
choose an abortion under Roe and holding further that requiring the consent of one parent
before a minor could receive an abortion did not impose an undue burden); H. L. v. Matheson,
450 U.S. 398 (1981) (upholding a state statute that required only that a minor seeking an
abortion notify a parent or guardian if possible); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (ruling
that a state statute requiring parental consent or judicial approval following parental
notification was unconstitutional); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976)
(holding a blanket parental consent requirement for minors seeking an abortion to be
unconstitutional).
227. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995) (holding that the benefit of a
federal statute must outweigh any burden imposed upon commerce by the statute).
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3. Edwards v. California 28
In Edwards v. California, the Supreme Court reversed a lower
court's conviction of a man who had violated a state statute making it
a misdemeanor to bring or assist in bringing a non-resident indigent
person, who was known to be indigent, into the state of California.3 0
While Congress has the express authority under Article I, Section 8 of
the Constitution 231 to regulate interstate commerce, the powers of
individual states to enact legislation that impacts interstate commerce
is limited.232
The Court found the state statute in Edwards
unconstitutional because the activity that the state was regulating was
beyond its regulatory power.'
Because the transport of people
across state lines is commercial,
only
Congress can regulate this type
2M
of economic activity.
Under Lopez, however, the power of Congress to enact legislation
that impacts commercial activity that does not substantially impact
interstate commerce is limited. 2 5- Thus, both Congress and individual
states have limited ability to enact legislation that negatively impacts
the transportation of people across state lines."s
Consequently,
neither individual states nor Congress can enact legislation either
identical or similar to the CCPA2 7 without running afoul of the
Constitution.
4. Privileges and Immunities
The Constitution provides for the protection of United States
citizens to travel from state to state and for the endowment of the
same privileges and immunities throughout our country."' This
provision stands today and has been held to protect a woman's right
228. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
229. See id. (holding that a state statute that restricts interstate travel is not valid).
230. See id. at 160 (stating that the constitutional limitation upon state power to interfere
with interstate transportation of persons is not subject to an exception in the case of paupers).
231. U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8.
232. See Edwards, 314 U.S. at 173 (stating that the attempts on the part of any single state to
isolate itself from difficulties common to all states is subject to certain boundaries),
233. See id. (holding that the state statute imposed an unconstitutional burden upon
interstate commerce).
234. See id (stating that under the Commerce Clause the power to regulate interstate
commerce is confined to Congress).
235. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560 (holding that statutes enacted by Congress must substantially
affect interstate commerce).
236. Id.
237. H.R. 3682, 105th Cong. (1998).
238. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2; see also Kreimer, Right to Trave
(characterizing the Privileges and Immunities Clause).

supra note 202, at 916
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to enter a state different from her residency and be entitled to the
same medical procedures to which a resident would be entitled.239
In Doe v. Bolton,240 the Supreme Court reviewed a Georgia statute

that required Georgia residency for any woman seeking an abortion
in Georgia. 24' The Georgia statute in question was part of the state's
criminal code, which provided for circumstances under which
performing an abortion would be a criminal act. 242 The statute was

first challenged when Mary Doe and 23 other individuals, together
with two non-profit corporations, filed a federal action against the
state of Georgia seeking a declaratory judgment that the entire
Georgia statute relating to criminal abortion was unconstitutional.243
The District Court of Georgia invalidated several portions of the
statute and granted declaratory relief in relation to those invalid
portions. In an effort to have the entire statute invalidated, Doe
appealed the District
Court of Georgia's decision directly to the
245
Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court held that the portion of the Georgia statute
which required the pregnant woman seeking an abortion to be a
Georgia resident was unconstitutional.24 6 The Court reasoned that
"the Privileges and Immunities Clause ...protects persons who enter

other States to ply their trade, so it must protect persons who enter
Georgia seeking the medical services that are available there. 2 47 The

239. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 200 (1973) (overturning a Georgia statute that
required a person seeking an abortion in that state to be a Georgia resident).
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. See id. at 202-03 (citing GA. CODEANN. § 26-1202(b)(1)-(2)). The statute provided in
part:
(b) No abortion is authorized or shall be performed under this section unless
each of the following conditions is met:
(1) The pregnant woman requesting the abortion certifies in writing under
oath and subject to the penalties of a swearing to the physician who proposes to
perform the abortion that she is a bona fide legal resident of the state of
Georgia.
(2) The physician certifies that he believes the woman is a bona fide resident of
this State and the that he has no information which should lead him to believe
otherwise.
GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1202(b)(1)-(2).
243. Doe, 410 U.S. at 184-85.
244. Id. at 186-87.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 200.
247. Id.
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Court further stated that upholding the statute would enable a state
to limit medical care to its own citizens."8
5. Violation of Roe
The landmark holding in Roe remains law, despite numerous
challenges throughout the years. When this decision was handed
down, new rights emerged and were recognized by the highest court
in the land. Roe not only changed the way that the rights of women
would be viewed, it changed the language of discussions regarding
abortion. 219 Debates involving abortion usually focus on the notion of
viability and the impact of this standard on this decision and later
Supreme Court decisions that interpret abortion rights.50 In Roe, the
Court held that "[f] or the stage prior to approximately the end of the
first trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left
to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending
physician. " 25' Thus, the right to obtain an abortion during the first
trimester is absolute and may not be impinged upon by federal, state
or local statutes. After the completion of the first trimester, however,
states have the right to regulate or prohibit abortion except when the
life of the mother is at issue. 52 The Court in Roe ultimately left it to
the states to regulate abortion after the first trimester. 3
The CCPA seems at odds with the decision in Roe. In Roe the Court
defined the right to privacy and subsequent right to obtain an
abortion during the first trimester, and left the matter of regulating
abortion after the first trimester to the states. 4 In the CCPA,
Congress confronts the issue of abortion by prohibiting the transport
of minors across state lines to obtain an abortion in order to avoid
parental and judicial involvement. 5 This Congressional resolution
appears to regulate an issue that was left to the states to regulate.
Consequently, the CCPA appears to be at odds with the Supreme
Court's decision in Roe.

248. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 200 (1973).
249. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
250. After Roe, Americans were armed with a new vocabulary and framework with which to
debate abortion. Furthermore, given the extreme emotional nature of the opinions of many
Americans regarding the Roe decision, it is safe to say that an overwhelming number of
Americans have engaged in at least one debate about the merits of the Roe decision.
251. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164.
252. Id. at 164-65.
253. Id.
254. See id. at 164-65 (holding that, due to the viability standard, the abortion decision
remains with the pregnant woman and her doctor).
255. H.R. 3682, 105th Cong. (1998).
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The CCPA!5' fails in four respects. First, under Lopez, the Act
regulates a commercial activity that does not substantially impact
interstate commerce257 Second, under Edwards, the Act prohibits a
specific type of interstate travel, which a state cannot regulate and
Congress can only regulate in a limited regard.2' s Third, under Doe,
the Act limits medical care in some states to only those pregnant
teens who are residents of that state.' 9 Finally, under Roe, the Act
requires that our federal government engage in regulating abortion
20
when such regulation has already been delegated to the states.

VI. PROPOSAL FOR LEGISLATION

It is not clear what the House of Representatives intended to
accomplish by enacting the CCPA. On the surface, it seems that
Congress was attempting to do what the states cannot do: enact
legislation that prohibits people from transporting minors across
state lines to get an abortion and thus avoid parental involvement
statutes. 261
Recognizing the shortcomings of having parental
involvement statutes spottily enacted across the nation, and thus
creating opportunities to hop in a car and get an abortion just over
the river, Congress thought they would attempt to fill the gaps. 62
What we have, however, are state statutes that trample on the privacy
rights of minor women and a federal resolution that, if enacted into
law, would place a person in jail for helping a woman exercise the
right granted to her in Roe.
Why have courts been so willing to recognize and support the right
of an adult woman to obtain an abortion without gaining the consent
of anyone but herself and her physician, but unwilling to recognize
256. Id.
257. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995) (determining that legislation must
'substantially affect" interstate commerce in order to be deemed constitutional).
258. See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 172 (1941) (articulating the scope of
Congressional authority to regulate interstate travel and the limitations imposed upon states to
regulate interstate travel).
259. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 200 (1973) (holding that states had to make available
its services to all citizens because otherwise "a State could limit to its own residents the general
medical care available within its borders" and this holding would be repugnant to the Court).
260. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (stating that "[flor the stage subsequent to
viability, the State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses,
regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical
judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother").
261. See Edwards, 314 U.S. at 174 (holding that a state statute may not burden interstate
travel).
262. See Child Custody Protection Act, H.R. 3682, 105th Cong. at § 2 (1998) (making it a
crime to "avoid certain laws relating to abortion").
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this same right for minor women? What is so magical about age
eighteen that renders a person suddenly mature enough to have
access to medical procedures without the involvement of the state
and parents? Furthermore, how different is a seventeen year old
woman from an eighteen year old woman? The arbitrariness of the
age of majority is puzzling. Perhaps rather than force a minor
pregnant woman to seek out the approval of parents and judges
when she wants an abortion, parents and courts should be thankful
that the minor has realized the extreme disadvantage she and her
child would face if she chose to bring the pregnancy to term. ' 6s
Given the recent data showing that the teenage birthrate has
decreased nationwide,"' perhaps Congress should begin work on
resolutions that seek to continue this positive trend. It seems only
obvious that one way to reduce the number of abortions among
teenage women is to reduce the rate at which they are getting
pregnant.26
Standing in the face of this effort, however, is the
seemingly Victorian prejudice held by a majority of members of
Congress. Rather than encouraging use of contraceptives and
supporting sex education programs, the legislative branch prefers
creating new ways to infringe upon the limited rights of minors.
A. Support Community Efforts
The first thing that can be done to continue the positive trend of
declining teenage birthrates is for Congress to abandon all current
efforts to restrict teenagers' access to abortion. Having done this,
Congress should then seek to support community efforts to distribute
contraceptives
and provide sex education to students in public
6
26

schools.

263. See Schmidt, supra note 12, at 600 (reporting that women who become mothers during
their teenage years are more likely to be on welfare and to hold low-paying jobs and, in
addition, that the children of teenage mothers are more likely to have lower IQs).
264. See TEENAGE BIRTHS, supranote 2, at 2; RECENT DECLINES, supra note 17, at 1 (showing
data indicating a decreasing birthrate among teenagers).
265. The purpose of the Child Custody Protection Act is to support state laws which either
prohibit or limit teenage women's access to abortion. Child Custody Protection Act, H.R. 3682,

105th Cong. (1998). Given the purpose of this federal act and the nature of the state laws that
this act seeks to support, it appears that Congress supports efforts to reduce the number of
abortions obtained by teenage women. If, in fact, Congress endeavors to reduce the number of
abortions among teenage women, then the Child Custody Protection Act may not be the only
avenue toward realizing such a goal. Fewer pregnancies among teenagers should result in

fewer abortions among teenagers.
266. By supporting community based programs aimed at providing sex education and
distributing condoms, the costs of developing and implementing identical or similar federal
programs would be avoided. In this way, the Congressional effort to reduce teenage abortion
would be furthered by funding proactive community programs.
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B. ProvideIncentives to States
Congress should enact legislation that provides incentives to states
that continue to experience declines in the teenage birthrate.
Incentives could be in the form of additional funds for public
education or increased funding for road projects.2 7 Simply offering
incentives to states for realizing a decline in teenage birthrates will
promote state efforts to ensure that these rates continue to decline.2
In so doing, both state governments and the federal government can
point to these declines as proof that societal ills can be approached
proactively. Furthermore, the result of this joint effort will be that
abortion 21
remains accessible and safe while also making abortion less
frequent.
C. Mobilize Executive Agencies
Finally, agencies under the executive branch should be charged
with developing and implementing programs that are aimed at
reducing the teenage birthrate. Executive agencies such as the
Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") are optimally
positioned to impact the teenage birthrate.270
Given that HHS
administers programs covering such areas as the prevention of child
abuse and domestic violence and the treatment and prevention of
substance abuse, it is not too far fetched an idea that this department
could create and administer a program aimed at maintaining and
further reducing the teenage birthrate.'

267. The type of incentive is not terribly important. Instead, it is important that the federal
government create an incentive for states to develop and implement programs that are geared
toward furthering the declines in the teenage birthrate.
268. In order to create a single national legal drinking age of 21 years old, the federal
government enacted a statute, which required every state to raise its legal drinking age to 21 or
risk losing federal highway funds. See 23 U.S.C.A. § 158 (West 1998) (creating a withholding
penalty of 10% of federal highway funds if a state fails to comply with the minimum drinking
age of 21 years of age). Given the resulting national drinking age of 21 years old, it is clear that
Congress has the ability to enact legislation that elicits a desired response from individual states.
The issue of reducing teenage birthrates is no different. Congress has the ability to encourage
individual states to implement programs that will further reduce the teenage birthrate.
269. Should state governments and the federal government develop programs that actually
result in further declines in the teenage birthrate, the most likely result would be a decline in
the number of abortions that teenage women obtain. Such programs would not focus on
abortion, rather their aim would be to reduce pregnancies among teenage women.
Accordingly, the legislative efforts would be aimed at reducing the number of abortions and
not creating new obstacles to obtaining abortions. In this way, abortions would be less frequent
while remaining safe and accessible.
270. See HHS: Whtat WeDo (last revisedJan. 4, 1999) <http://vw.hhs.gov/about/profile.
html> (describing the primary functions of HHS and the programs and activities it
administers).
271. Id.
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VII. CONCLUSION

While it is fortunate that the teenage birthrate is declining, it is
important to ensure that these declines continue. Our federal and
local governments should seek to capitalize on this positive trend by
enacting programs that seek to propel the teenage birthrate further
downward. Moreover, the current federal efforts to restrict access to
abortion should not further infringe upon the limited rights of
minors. Instead, we should abandon the distinctions between adult
women and teenage girls, and we should extend the right to privacy
and the right to have access to abortion to all women, regardless of

age.

